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Abstract: As part of an international collaboration to compare large-scale 
commons, we used the Social-Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database 
(SESMAD) to systematically map out attributes of and changes in the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park (GBRMP) in Australia. We focus on eight design principles from 
common-pool resource (CPR) theory and other key social-ecological systems 
governance variables, and explore to what extent they help explain the social and 
ecological outcomes of park management through time. Our analysis showed that 
commercial fisheries management and the re-zoning of the GBRMP in 2004 led 
to improvements in ecological condition of the reef, particularly fisheries. These 
boundary and rights changes were supported by effective monitoring, sanctioning 
and conflict resolution. Moderate biophysical connectivity was also important 
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for improved outcomes. However, our analysis also highlighted that continued 
challenges to improved ecological health in terms of coral cover and biodiversity 
can be explained by fuzzy boundaries between land and sea, and the significance 
of external drivers to even large-scale social-ecological systems (SES). While 
ecological and institutional fit in the marine SES was high, this was not the case 
when considering the coastal SES. Nested governance arrangements become even 
more important at this larger scale. To our knowledge, our paper provides the first 
analysis linking the re-zoning of the GBRMP to CPR and SES theory. We discuss 
important challenges to coding large-scale systems for meta-analysis.
Keywords: Coral reefs, fisheries, Great Barrier Reef, large-scale, marine, social-
ecological system 
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1. Introduction
Large-scale environmental problems are common but difficult to resolve – and 
study – due to their complexity. A number of theories and frameworks have been 
developed to understand environmental change and management and, from these, 
variables or conditions associated with success or failure in governance have 
been identified. Common-pool resource (CPR) theory, which aims to explain 
how collective action emerges and is maintained, was built from empirical and 
experimental work in natural resource management (Ostrom 1990). One of the 
first meta-analyses of community-based resource management systems identified 
eight broad conditions – the design principles – that were more likely than other 
factors to be associated with collective action and durable local institutions 
(Ostrom 1990). While the number of enabling conditions for the sustainability 
of the commons expanded as studies became more numerous and diversified 
across various resource systems (Agrawal 2003), the design principles remain a 
foundation of CPR theory.
The eight design principles include (Ostrom 1990): clearly-defined boundaries 
(explicit delineation of the boundaries of the resource system and the resource user 
group to ensure clarity on who has rights to use and manage what); congruence 
between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions (appropriateness 
of both sets of rules to their local context and proportionality or congruence with 
each other); collective-choice arrangements (existence of arrangements where 
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most of those affected by operational rules are involved in their formulation); 
monitoring (presence of monitors, who are accountable to resource users or who 
are resource users themselves and are in charge of auditing both resource status 
and the behaviour (compliance) of resource users); graduated sanctions (existence 
of penalties that differentially punish those who violate resource-use rules 
according to the seriousness and frequency of their violations); conflict resolution 
mechanisms (availability of low-cost conflict management arrangements to 
those who use and manage a resource system); minimum recognition of rights 
to organise (respect of resource-users’ rights to devise their own institutions by 
external government authorities); and nested enterprises (organization of various 
governance activities such as appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, 
and conflict resolution across multiple levels or scales).
Recent quantitative review of 91 studies pertaining to the design principles 
finds that they continue to be well supported empirically (Cox et al. 2010). 
However, most of these studies have focused on relatively small-scale 
systems, comprising a single resource and one or two user groups such as 
single catchments or single-jurisdiction fisheries, forests or irrigation systems 
(Agrawal 2001). Increasingly, awareness of the cross-scale and dynamic 
nature of environmental problems has led to new concepts and frameworks 
that aim to account for the complexity of human-environment interactions 
(Berkes and Folke 2000; Ostrom 2007). Literature on social-ecological systems 
(SES) explicitly frames environmental problems and solutions in terms of the 
linkages and feedbacks between coupled social and ecological systems, thereby 
encouraging consideration of multiple drivers of change, actors and interests, 
institutional arrangements, and outcomes. An important research gap in CPR 
and other environmental governance theories is the extent to which their findings 
apply to SES at larger scales.
The Social-Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database (SESMAD) project 
is an international collaboration to help address this research gap. We have 
developed a database to comparatively analyse large SES, which is structured 
around the SES framework. The framework is a multi-tiered classificatory system 
that organizes a large number of social and ecological variables across four main 
components: resource systems, resource units, actors, and governance systems 
(Ostrom 2007, 2009). Together they produce interactions and outcomes, which 
comprise a central component of the framework. Each of the components can be 
unpacked into more specific types and sub-types, where a final list of relevant 
variables would depend on the characteristics of the system being examined 
(Basurto and Ostrom 2009).
To date, the SESMAD project has used five core case-studies of large-scale 
systems with sufficient published literature to enable coding of cases into the 
database across an extensive range of variables. Until more cases are coded we 
cannot utilize the database for a quantitative comparative study. However, the 
discipline of coding such a large number of social, ecological and governance 
variables, plus interactions between variables, enabled us to produce an insightful 
Keeping the ‘Great’ in the Great Barrier Reef 399
qualitative analysis of each of the five cases. This paper focuses on the Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP), Australia.
We ask: how do the key changes in management through time relate to social 
and ecological outcomes? And, do principles derived from governance research 
in small-scale systems apply to the GBRMP? To answer these questions we 
systematically examine how the CPR design principles apply to the GBRMP as a 
large system, and then we identify other key variables from the SES framework, 
as well as the case-specific literature, that stand out as important in understanding 
and explaining the governance outcomes in the GBRMP.
The GBRMP is large and complex. It covers about 345,000 km2, contains 
many types of ecosystems (e.g. islands, coral reefs, seagrass, deep ocean), and 
provides a variety of ecosystem services to people (GBRMPA 2009; Stoeckl 
et al. 2011). The GBRMP was established in 1975 and re-zoned in 2004 to 
improve biodiversity conservation. Governance of the GBRMP is commonly 
portrayed as a marine conservation success story (Fernandes et al. 2005; Olsson 
et al. 2008; McCook et al. 2010), but despite the park’s history of adaptive 
management (Hughes et al. 2007a), concerns continue today about human 
impacts, primarily from land-based and climate change related influences. 
There is a wealth of literature on the GBRMP but relatively few analyses relate 
the outcomes of zoning, re-zoning, and adaptive management to established 
governance theories or frameworks, as we aim to do here. By viewing the 
GBRMP as a linked SES and considering the CPR design principles in full, our 
analysis highlights key dimensions of success and failure in the GBRMP. The 
case therefore provides some important insights for large-scale environmental 
management.
2. Methods
The methods used here were developed collaboratively as part of the SESMAD 
project (Cox 2014). SESMAD facilitates systematic collection of information on 
the social and ecological attributes of large-scale SES, the basic unit of analysis, 
through content analysis of published studies. In the GBRMP case, we examined 
relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature to develop an understanding of the 
GBRMP’s adaptive management processes, successes and challenges through 
time. We focused on peer-reviewed studies, and reports and other documentation 
(policy, legislation, management plans) published by agencies involved in the 
management of the GBRMP. Multiple coders then analyzed the case. Each coder 
attended multiple training sessions and project coordination meetings to ensure 
consistency in coding approaches and variable definitions to ensure inter-coder 
reliability, as discussed in the introductory article.
Analysis of available literature on the GBRMP was used to enter data into 
the SESMAD database, a relational database hosted at Dartmouth College (see 
Cox 2014). This database contains information on approximately 200 variables 
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of relevance to the study of SES. Variables are organised in tables describing the 
SES itself, its components, and the interactions among these components (see 
Figure 1). The SES is defined as a system containing at least one resource system 
or unit, here referred to as environmental common, at least one governance 
system, and one or more actor groups. These represent the components that 
are coded. The governance system table captures information on institutional 
arrangements, such as rules, policies, and governance activities. The actor table 
contains characteristics of individuals, organizations, and/or nations who use, 
manage or otherwise interact with an environmental common. The environmental 
commons table identifies and categorizes an environmental common, such 
as an ecosystem, resource, or pollutant. As a relational database, information 
on relationships between these components is stored in the interaction tables. 
Typically, the interaction tables describe interactions between the governance 
system, actors and environmental commons. Different governance regimes or 
time-periods in the management of an environmental common are reflected in 
different interactions between the components.
In the GBRMP case, we defined key components as those for which there 
is evidence of important interactions with social and ecological parts of the 
system at the scale of the whole GBRMP. To capture changes through time in the 
management of the GBRMP, we examined two time-periods: before (1975–1999) 
and after (2004–2012) a re-zoning effort. Within each time-period the governance 
system, environmental commons and actor variables, and their interactions are 
Governance System:
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act
EC: Coral reef 
Actor:
Fisheries managers
(Fisheries Queensland)  
Actor:
Reef managers
(GBRMP Authority & QPWS) 
Actor:
Commercial fishers 
Actor:
Recreational fishers 
Interactions: Pre re-zoning 
(1975-1999) 
Non representative Marine Park with 
4% of total area in no-take zones. 
EC: Target fish 
Interactions: Post re-zoning
(2004-to date)
Representative Marine Park with
33% of total area and at least 20% of
all 70 bioregions in no-take zones. 
Figure 1: Schematic of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park as a Social-Ecological System. Two 
time-periods – pre and post a marine park re-zoning program – are captured through two sets 
of interactions. Under the Environmental Commons (EC), ‘Target fish’ are species targeted by 
commercial and recreational fishers.
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considered to be relatively fixed. Yet, some variables have different values across 
the two time-periods. By comparing the two time-periods we capture changes in 
GBRMP management characteristics and outcomes, and we identify key variables 
that are associated with altered outcomes. These changes relate to the re-zoning 
and to other management adaptations that occurred within the two time-periods. 
We exclude the transitional time period of the re-zoning (1999–2004) because 
the SES was experiencing rapid change, which precludes accurate recording of 
variables. Next, we outline the major events characterising management of the 
GBRMP, before further detailing how this particular case was structured and 
coded.
3. Case Background: Timeline of The Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park
Table 1 lists the major events characterising the management of the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park. Ecological disturbance events are in italics.
3.1. Initial zoning plan for the Great Barrier Reef (1975–1999)
A Royal Commission on drilling for petroleum (1974) and broader concerns 
about cumulative impacts and the lack of a dedicated regulatory authority for 
the Great Barrier Reef led to the passing of the Great Barrier Reef Act in 1975 
(GBRMPA 2009). The Act established the GBR Region and a new federal 
agency as the park’s authority (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, 
GBRMPA). The Act prohibited mining in the GBR Region and enabled planning 
and implementation of zones. These included no-entry, no-take, and different 
multiple-use zones, which were gradually implemented between 1981 and 1992 
(Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975). The GBRMP is co-managed by the 
Federal government and Queensland’s state government. These institutional 
arrangements reflect what Kittinger et al. (2010) refer to as co-trusteeship, 
describing joint management by government agencies, as distinct from co-
management, which typically describes joint management by resource users and 
government (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). This co-trusteeship arrangement uses 
a plethora of management tools to regulate fisheries, tourism, traditional use, 
research and shipping in the Region.
Almost 20 years after its establishment, the GBRMP Authority initiated a 
strategic planning process to Keep the Great Barrier Reef ‘Great’ (GBRMPA 
1994). This involved an independent review of the Authority (Brown 1997), and 
culminated in a 25-year strategic plan for the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage 
Area (established in 1981) (Nursey-Bray and Rist 2009). The GBRMP Authority 
itself was restructured around core strategic goals and principles (GBRMPA 
1994), and a large-scale analysis of the effectiveness of the current zoning plan 
was undertaken. The result by 1997–1998 was broad scientific and management 
consensus around the need to increase the extent of no-take zones to improve 
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Table 1: Major events in GBR Region managements.
 Date  Event
Initial zoning system 
1975–1999
1975  Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act passed
 1979  Offshore Constitutional Settlement signed
  Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement signed between 
Federal and State government 
 1981  Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area established
 1992/1993  Aboriginal native title recognised
 1994  Fisheries Act passed
 1997  Dugong Protection Areas agreed
  AU$2.8 million license buyback in East Coast Inshore FinFish 
Fishery (net fisheries) as part of Dugong Protection Area 
Restructuring Package
  Tropical Cyclone Justin
 1998  National Representative System of Marine Protected Areas policy
  El Niño Southern Oscillation coral bleaching 
Transition period 
1999–2004
 1999  Representative Areas Program commences
  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
(EPBC) passed
 2000  Queensland East Coast Trawl Fisheries Management Plan 
published
  AU$20 million license buyback in East Coast Trawl Fishery 
removing 11% of effort 
 2001  Croker Decision extending Indigenous Australian’s rights to Sea 
Country
 2002  Coral bleaching event
 2003  Reef Water Quality Plan introduced
Re-zoned system 
2004 – to date
 2004  New Zoning Plan for the GBRMP passed and implemented
  Queensland Coral Reef FinFish Fishery Management Plan 
implemented
  Structural Adjustment Package framework to buy out or re-
structure fishing businesses developed
  Queensland’s Marine Parks Act passed and Great Barrier Reef 
Coast Marine Park established
 2006  Coral bleaching event in southern Great Barrier Reef
 2006/2007  Amendment to the GBRMP Act of 1975
 2008  Reef Water Quality Partnership and Reef Rescue program initiated
 2009  Tropical Cyclone Hamish
 2009  Guidelines for commercial operators in the Queensland East Coast 
Inshore Finfish Fishery published
 2009  Great Barrier Reef Outlook Report published
 2009  Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement revised
 2010  Queensland East Coast Trawl Fisheries Management Plan updated
 2011  Tropical Cyclone Yasi and coastal floods
 2012  UNESCO report on the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area
 2013  AU$9 million license buyback in East Coast Inshore FinFish 
Fishery (net fisheries)
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biodiversity conservation and resilience of the Reef to wide-scale disturbances. 
The re-zoning process was initiated in 1999.
3.2. Transition period (1999–2004)
A systematic conservation planning approach – the Representative Areas Program 
(RAP) – was undertaken to identify and implement a larger system of no-take 
zones that represented the diversity of bioregions and habitats encompassed 
in the GBRMP. The approach included compilation of more than 40 datasets 
on biological and physical diversity, two rounds of community consultation 
(May 2002 and June 2003) resulting in consideration of over 30,000 written 
submissions, and extensive public communication and awareness campaigns 
(Olsson et al. 2008; McCook et al. 2010). A new zoning plan was passed into 
law in July 2004 (Olsson et al. 2008). The new zoning plan designated seven 
marine zones ranging from ‘most reasonable use’ to ‘no-entry’ areas reserved 
for research purposes only. The biggest changes were an increase in the area 
covered by no-take zones from about 4% to 33% and inclusion of 20% of each 
bioregion in a no-take zone. Financial support was provided to fishing-related 
businesses impacted by the re-zoning. By 2006 the Federal government had 
provided an estimated AU$250 million for structural adjustment of more than 
1700 businesses affected by the rezoning (Gunn et al. 2010). A separate process 
of significant reform to the fisheries sector also took place because of a concern 
about their sustainability [e.g. 40% reduction in effort and capacity of the East 
Coast Trawl Fishery (ECOTF 2011), and; introduction of Total Allowable 
Commercial Catch (TACC) and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) for the 
Coral Reef FinFish Fishery (CRFFF 2011)]. In November 2004, Queensland’s 
state government implemented the GBR Region Coast Marine Park, which 
provided complementary zoning within adjacent state marine waters (Day 2002).
3.3. Re-zoned system (2004-to date)
Consistent monitoring and research has shown that no-take areas are effective 
at increasing fish biomass, thus supporting the scientific argument for 
increasing the area of no-take zones to improve biodiversity and resilience 
of the Reef (McCook et al. 2010). Since the re-zoning, reform of the fisheries 
sector has continued, for instance more stringent controls have been legislated 
in the East Coast Inshore Finfish Fishery (gillnet and line fishery) through a 
TACC allowance, new size and bag limits, and annual seasonal closures for 
some species (Tobin et al. 2010; ECIFF 2011). But the focus of management 
concern has largely shifted to land-based impacts and climate change. While 
the GBRMP Authority does not have the authority to directly manage activities 
on land, they are mandated to act on impacts to the Reef and are working 
with other management agencies to try to reduce land-based impacts (Brodie 
and Waterhouse 2012), including those from new port developments along the 
Queensland coast (Brodie 2013).
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4. Coding and analyzing the GBRMP as a large-scale SES
4.1. Structure of the GBRMP case
In order to code and analyse the GBRMP as a large-scale SES, we deconstructed 
the system into its simplest component parts. We aimed to capture components 
and interactions that might explain governance outcomes, but which did not over-
complicate coding. We considered the following components to be integral because 
of the extent of their interaction within the SES at the scale of the Great Barrier 
Reef: The GBRMP Act is an over-arching piece of legislation that has endured 
for over 38 years, which sets up the governance system for the marine park. We 
use a single Act to represent the governance system in the SES database, although 
in our analysis we recognise and account for the contribution of other GBRMP 
institutions as outlined in Table 1. Four actor groups emerged because of their 
influence on managing and extracting from the system: two that implement the 
Act (reef managers and fisheries managers), and two user groups (commercial and 
recreational fishers). Reef managers are comprised of two government agencies 
from two levels of government – the GBRMP Authority and Queensland Parks 
and Wildlife Service (QPWS) – who are jointly responsible for management of 
the Reef. Reef managers are then distinguished from Fisheries Queensland – the 
management authority responsible for commercial and recreational fisheries in 
the state – because of their different mandates and responsibilities. Commercial 
fishers comprising distinct fishing sectors that act at a regional scale, for example 
the Trawl, Line and Net fisheries, were taken as one actor group because the same 
authorities manage them using similar management tools. Recreational fishers 
were taken as a separate actor group and were considered as individuals acting 
at a local scale because participation in representative organisations is limited 
(Taylor et al. 2012). This selection of actors clearly simplifies the complex social-
ecological system interactions taking place in the GBRMP for the purposes of 
analysis. We acknowledge that there are many other actor groups interacting with 
the Reef (Figure 1). Reef tourism, for instance, is a major income generator for 
the Region (Stoeckl et al. 2011). However tourism impact is concentrated and 
considered to be minor (GBRMPA 2009; Day and Dobbs 2013). Our analysis has 
focused on the significant impacts directly addressed by the re-zoning process. 
For practical purposes, we coded two aspects of the environmental common: 
coral reef, and; species targeted by commercial and recreational fishers (hereafter 
“target fish”). We chose these because relatively good information exists about 
their change through time with management, and because they serve as proxies 
for different aspects of the health of the Reef.
We coded the GBRMP case for two time periods: from establishment to the 
initiation of the re-zoning process (1975–1999), and from implementation of the 
new zoning plans to date (2004–2012). We omitted coding the transition period 
from 1999 to 2004 because many changes were taking place during that time, and 
our main interest was in assessing differences between the early management of 
the reef, and the period after all the re-zoning changes had been implemented.
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4.2. Social and ecological outcomes
The GBRMP is commonly held up as an example of successful marine 
management (Fernandes et al. 2005; Olsson et al. 2008; McCook et al. 2010), 
yet the social and ecological outcomes were mixed when comparing the pre- and 
post- re-zoning periods (Table 2). Ecologically, strong evidence exists that the 
no-take zones are effective at increasing biomass of targeted species within their 
boundaries (McCook et al. 2010), and that they provide some ecological benefits 
(spillover) beyond their borders (Harrison et al. 2012). Adaptive management of 
commercial fisheries in combination with the re-zoning of the park means that 
many commercially targeted fish populations are now considered to be sustainably 
fished (Fisheries Queensland 2011) or stable (GBRMPA 2009). However, data 
are limited: many species cannot be properly assessed (e.g. undefined species in 
Figure 2) and ecosystem effects of fishing are unknown (GBRMPA 2009; Day 
and Dobbs 2013, although see Grech and Coles 2011). Uncertainty also remains 
around recreationally important species due to the relative lack of systematic 
monitoring of recreational fishing effort. In the most recent stock assessment 
report “a number of recreationally important species remained either ‘uncertain’ 
or ‘undefined’ due to the lack of recent statewide recreational fishing estimates” 
(Fisheries Queensland 2011, 6). A recently published survey of Queensland’s 
recreational fishery does not clarify the stock status of target fish but does report 
some key findings since 2000: i) the number of recreational fishers has declined; 
Table 2: Social and ecological outcomes of management of the GBRMP as coded in the 
SESMAD database. (Some changes may be the result of management changes that were initiated 
separately to the re-zoning process but which occurred within the two different time periods.).
Outcome  Pre-re-zoning 
(1975–1999)
 Post-re-zoning 
(2004–2012)
 References
Resource outcomes    
  Change in fish stocks  Decreased slightly  Increased slightly  (Kerrigan et al. 2004; 
Mapstone et al. 2004; 
Fisheries Queensland 2011) 
  Change in coral cover  Decreased slightly  Decreased 
slightly
 (GBRMPA 2009)
  Effect of management 
on fish stock status
 Little effect  Effective  DAFF 2011
Effect of management 
on coral cover
 No effect  Little effect  (Hughes et al. 2011; Brodie 
and Waterhouse 2012)
Biodiversity trend  Slight decrease  Mixed effects  (McCook et al. 2010)
   
Outcomes for users    
Human use of 
resources (fishing)
 Mixed or increased  Slight decline  (Kerrigan et al. 2004; 
Mapstone et al. 2004; 
Fisheries Queensland 2011)
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Figure 2: Summary of the stock status of fish listed as targeted by the Line, Net and Trawl 
fisheries of Queensland (Fisheries Queensland 2011; DAFF 2011). Mulloway, Bay prawns and 
Jobfish are also listed as targeted species but were not included in the stock status report. Many 
of the species listed above are also targeted by the recreational fishing sector.
ii) catch and effort have declined, with the exception of catch for barramundi, 
mangrove jack and tropical snapper, which were higher in 2010, iii) catch declined 
more than effort suggesting fewer fish for similar effort, and; iii) commercial catch 
for barramundi, whiting and Spanish mackerel were higher than recreational catch 
but for cobia, pearl perch, snapper, spotted mackerel and tailor recreational catch 
was higher (Taylor et al. 2012). Currently, the Pink snapper (Pagrus auratus), 
which is targeted by both commercial and recreational fishers, and sharks and rays 
targeted as commercial species and caught as by-catch in the East Coast Inshore 
Finfish Fishery are considered most vulnerable to over-exploitation (Fisheries 
Queensland 2011). Other resources are not doing as well overall. In particular, 
coral cover (Sweatman 2008; GBRMPA 2009; Hughes et al. 2011; De’ath et al. 
2012) and some charismatic species (turtles, dugongs) are declining (GBRMPA 
2009). Declines in coral cover are uncertain as noted in the GBR Region Outlook 
Report (2009). Most recently, De’ath et al. (2012) report a decline in initial coral 
cover of 50.7%. There is also some scientific debate about the relative contribution 
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of proximate and distal drivers of this coral cover decline, which include extreme 
events (cyclones), crown-of-thorns starfish, water quality, temperature anomalies 
and climate change.
Social outcomes of management of the GBRMP are not monitored as 
thoroughly as ecological outcomes. Only very recently has a long-term 
monitoring approach for social outcomes been developed and deployed (Marshall 
et al. 2013). This means changes over time remain difficult to ascertain (Table 2). 
While the condition of many fish stocks has improved over time, commercial 
access to fish decreased following changes in fisheries management, license 
buy-outs, and re-zoning (e.g. Grech and Coles 2011). Marshall and colleagues 
(2013) found that commercial fishers felt much less optimistic about the future 
of their business in the GBR Region than about the future of the GBR Region 
as a whole. In the recreational sector, recreational fishing is still cited as among 
the top leisure activities for Queenslanders with over 700,000 recreational fishers 
(Taylor et al. 2012). However, while the coastal population has increased over the 
past decade, data suggest that participation in the sector has declined by 6% since 
2000 (Fisheries Queensland 2010) and that catch and effort have also declined 
over this period (Taylor et al. 2012). A follow-up survey by Sutton et al. (2009) 
suggests that recreational fishers’ participation in fishing is declining for reasons 
related to work and family rather than changing regulation within the sector. 
Other social outcomes are harder to document. Some conflict and discontent 
persists about the Representative Areas Programme and, in the commercial sector, 
the administration of the associated Structural Adjustment Package (Sutton and 
Tobin 2009; McCook et al. 2010; Lédée et al. 2012). Commercial fishers report 
moderate confidence that the GBR Region is well managed in general (Marshall 
et al. 2013). Nevertheless, increasingly, commercial resource-users that remained 
in the fishing sector are becoming more actively engaged in voluntary stewardship 
of the Reef through programs such as Reef Guardian Fishers (www.gbrmpa.gov.
au), suggesting increased commitment to its ecological outcomes.
4.3. Influence of important CPR variables
A number of variables were identified as important in characterising the 
governance context of the GBRMP and in explaining differential outcomes pre- 
and post- rezoning in 2004. Here, we focus first on the eight design principles for 
long-enduring resource management institutions (Ostrom 1990; Cox et al. 2010) 
before considering other variables of relevance to the GBRMP as a SES (Ostrom 
2007) (Table 3).
4.3.1. Design Principles
Boundaries: Here we consider the biophysical and administrative boundaries 
delineating the resource and the social boundaries defining communities of users. 
We coded clarity of physical boundaries, and clarity and negotiability of social 
and administrative boundaries.
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The Great Barrier Reef is the world’s largest coral reef and can be seen 
from space. The coral reef structure has clear physical boundaries, which have 
been mapped in detail. An ongoing review of the maps used to re-zone the reef 
identified only a few extra reefs or discrepancies in reef boundaries (Day 2013). 
In contrast, the resource boundaries of targeted fish are considered unclear at the 
scale of resource use due to their mobility (though technologies such as fishfinders 
render boundaries more clear). Most GBR Region fisheries target reef-associated 
(as opposed to reef-dependent) or pelagic species. Spatial distribution of both 
reef-associated and pelagic fish can be highly variable. Further, while many 
target fish likely remain within the boundaries of the Great Barrier Reef as a 
whole, evidence suggests that both adult fish and larvae move within and among 
reef habitats (Harrison et al. 2012), meaning that target fish cross administrative 
boundaries and therefore may change in their accessibility to fishers (i.e. if they 
move into and out of no-take zones). The biophysical boundary characteristics 
of the resources did not change with the re-zoning, but the interaction between 
physical and administrative boundaries did as the area of no-take zones increased.
The social boundaries defining resource user groups are clear in the GBRMP 
but differ in their negotiability for commercial and recreational fishers. Commercial 
fishers gain membership by buying and displaying a commercial fisher’s license 
and a boat license specific to their fishing sector. Following management 
changes in the fishing industry, no new licenses or symbols are available for 
existing fisheries, and thus these boundaries are rigid (non-negotiable). Fishing 
capacity in the commercial sector is well regulated. In contrast, no membership 
or licensing requirements exist for recreational fishers. As this ‘boundary rule’ is 
well established and widely communicated we consider the boundary to be clear; 
everyone knows what the rule is. However, as anyone can become a recreational 
fisher, whether they fish once a year or every day of the year, boundary negotiability 
is coded as fuzzy, rather than rigid.
The administrative boundary of the GBRMP and its zones are clearly delineated. 
The Australian Constitution and Offshore Constitutional Settlement (1979) 
designate ownership rights to coastal waters (high water mark to 3 nm seaward) to 
state governments. The GBRMP Act (1975) defines the Region as extending from 
the coastline at low water to six offshore points of latitude and longitude within 
Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The GBRMP covers 99% of the Region 
and incorporates most coastal waters including that in Queensland government’s 
jurisdiction (Day and Dobbs 2013). Further, the state and federal zoning plans are 
contiguous and don’t distinguish the state-federal marine park boundaries.
In the initial zoning scheme boundaries were defined relative to physical 
features such as the reef edge. However, these boundary definitions were considered 
unclear (see Day 2002 for more details on zone designation and lessons learned). 
Currently the zones of both the federal and state marine parks are defined by 
latitude and longitude coordinates. Physical and electronic zoning maps show 
both marine parks without distinction, and identify zones by name, objective, 
and colour (Day 2002). Zoning maps are available to users free of charge, and 
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boundaries are clearly demarcated and visible. These zoning boundaries are 
rigid – non-negotiable – for users, and compliance is considered to be moderate 
(see below under monitoring).
Clearly defining the extensive biophysical and administrative boundaries of the 
GBRMP as a large-scale SES is facilitated by access to technology (satellite tracking 
and mapping), scientific expertise and data (identifying and classifying habitat), 
and management capacity (administering seven marine zones with different uses). 
The boundary issue that appears to challenge the success of the GBRMP is the 
negotiability of social boundaries in recreational fishing, which is compounded by 
the number and distribution of recreational fishers across Queensland.
Ecological and institutional fit, and proportionality: Designation of the GBR 
Region and Management Authority in the 1975 Act defined a single management 
area, which aimed to encompass the entire reef ecosystem, and a single management 
authority. The Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement (1979 revised 
2009) signed between the Australian Federal Government and the Queensland 
State Government then enabled the GBRMP Authority to share management rights 
and responsibilities with state agencies such as the Queensland Parks and Wildlife 
Service. The GBRMP thus provides an example of purposeful, broad institutional fit 
within a large-scale SES. It is a single multiple-use MPA but it supports a diversity of 
uses, including fishing, tourism, traditional use, research, and shipping (GBRMPA 
2009). Management therefore comprises a broad range of tools in addition to zoning, 
such as Special Management Areas, Fisheries Management Plans, Tourism permits, 
Traditional Use of Marine Resources Agreements, and Designated Shipping 
Areas. As Day and Dobbs (2013, 8) note “clarity and consistency in defining 
legal objectives, jurisdictional boundaries, roles and responsibilities of different 
authorities and organisation has been critical in the management of the GBRMP”. 
The 2004 re-zoning of the GBRMP, and the Marine Parks Act of 2004 designating 
the GBR Region Coast Marine Park, which was contiguous with the GBRMP, 
further improved the ecological and institutional fit of this SES (Day 2002). The 
Representative Areas Program defined 70 different bioregions and the biophysical 
principles of the Representative Areas Programme process stated that 20% of each 
bioregion should be represented or protected in a no-take area. The GBRMP is a 
good example of ecological and institutional fit in a large-scale SES, particularly in 
terms of improved fisheries outcomes. Yet, there is growing recognition that external 
drivers of change, including land-use (agriculture and coastal development) and 
climate change are significant threats to the future condition of the Reef (GBRMPA 
2009). Land-based activities are outside of the direct jurisdiction of the GBRMP 
Authority. Nevertheless, the GBRMP Act 1975 and the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999) provide legislative frameworks under which 
agencies can work collaboratively to address activities that are indirectly harmful to 
the Marine Park and World Heritage Area (Day and Dobbs 2013).
Congruence between the rights and responsibilities of different actor groups is 
more uncertain for the GBRMP case. During the re-zoning process there was concern 
410 Louisa S. Evans et al.
over the costs imposed on commercial fishers and fishing-related businesses, yet the 
Structural Adjustment Package valued at AU$250 million was considered vastly 
disproportional to the estimated value of fisheries incorporated in no-take zones 
(Macintosh et al. 2010). Ongoing, there are a few rules that apply to resource users to 
ensure they contribute to the sustainable provision of ecosystem services, for instance: 
commercial vessels are obliged to compile daily fishing logbooks; trawl vessels are 
required to install vessel location monitoring systems to enhance ecological and 
compliance monitoring; and commercial and recreational fishers with TACC quota 
are required to log a fishing trip before going and to report their catch before landing 
to enable random checks at port. There is also increasing participation in voluntary 
provisioning activities such as stewardship and education programs (Day and Dobbs 
2013). To what extent these are proportional to the rights and benefits of appropriation 
is difficult to ascertain in this case. Feelings of unfairness about how impacts affect 
different types of commercial and recreational fisher have been reported, suggesting 
a perceived lack of proportionality (e.g. Teh-White et al. 2004).
Collective choice arrangements: There are several formal legislative arrangements 
that characterise management rights for the GBRMP. As mentioned above, the 
Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement (1979 revised 2009) provides 
the framework for co-trusteeship of the marine park between the GBRMP 
Authority and Queensland’s state agencies. In the 1990s several important events 
also meant the recognition of indigenous rights (Mabo Decision 1992; Native 
Title Act 1993; Croker Decision 2001 in Nursey-Bray and Rist 2009), which have 
been formalised as co-management of the GBRMP (GBRMP Act 1975; Nursey-
Bray and Rist 2009). Traditional owners have management rights and can prepare 
Traditional Use of Marine Resources Agreements for areas of importance in 
collaboration with the GBRMP Authority.
The GBRMP Act (1975) and the Fisheries Act (1994) set out the collective 
choice arrangements related to Zoning plans, Plans of Management (related to 
special areas or species), and Fisheries Management Plans. The former specifies 
minimum requirements for consultation, including the length of time a draft 
plan must be available to the public and the need to “consider any comments 
made in accordance with the notice” (GBRMP Act 1975, 33). The Fisheries Act 
(1994, S32) simply states that a fisheries agency must “take reasonable steps to 
engage in consultation” about a draft plan. Extensive consultation was undertaken 
during the re-zoning process. However, considerable animosity built up at the 
time between the GBRMP Authority and resource user groups, and there remain 
some misgivings over the participatory process (Sutton and Tobin 2009; Lédée 
et al. 2012). Macintosh et al. (2010) explain that while the Representative 
Areas Programme itself was collaborative, there was minimum consultation 
over the mechanisms of the Structural Adjustment Package administered by 
the Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority, which exacerbated concerns over 
the transparency and inclusiveness of the re-zoning process. Ongoing, Reef 
management is facilitated by four Reef Advisory Committees (which are thematic 
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and involve scientists) and 12 Local Marine Advisory Committees (based in 
12 towns/cities for involvement of community representatives). Management 
Advisory Committees for each fishery were also established but have since 
been discontinued. The extent to which fisheries management is consultative is 
less prescribed but has involved participation from representative organisations 
such as the Queensland Seafood Industry Association. Fisher groups also lobby 
government during important decision-making processes (Macintosh et al. 2010).
As co-management requires that responsibility and authority is shared between 
a resource-user group and a government agency (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997), we 
suggest that the GBRMP is not co-managed, for the most part (with the exception 
of Traditional Owners). And because of the scale of the SES, most stakeholders 
affected by operational rules in the GBRMP are not involved in collective choice 
decisions. Nevertheless, commercial and recreational fishers are increasingly 
represented in policy and planning processes and stakeholder groups do engage in 
lobbying activities. Political participation is relatively high but decision-making 
power rests with the management actors. Therefore, the political power of the 
user groups to actually change the operational rules they are governed under 
is considered to be moderate. Further, while fisher groups can and do organise 
politically, they do not typically create their own rules. The Marine Aquarium 
Fish fishery did develop its own stewardship guidelines (Donnelly 2013) but 
these are above and beyond existing government regulation. The rights to create 
rules are generally reserved to management actors. Yet, the governance system is 
durable and has been managing the resources adaptively. This outcome indicates 
that at large scales or in contexts of relatively high socio-economic security, such 
as Australia, it might not be necessary (or feasible) for all users to participate 
directly in creating and adapting rules.
Monitoring: The spatial extent and remoteness of much of the GBRMP pose 
significant challenges for monitoring. Nevertheless, much emphasis has been 
placed on environmental monitoring and experimentation. In 1993 the Australian 
Institute of Marine Science initiated long-term biological monitoring (underwater 
benthic and fish surveys) to capture the ecological impacts of anthropogenic 
changes and extreme events on the GBR Region and its different zones (www.
aims.gov.au). The re-zoning process was informed by a ten-year seascape-level 
experiment on 24 reefs conducted to test opening and closure regimes on reefs 
(Mapstone et al. 2004; Hughes et al. 2007b). Long term biological monitoring of 
the reef has been a key success and source of knowledge on reef status (decline 
and improvement), allowing for a re-thinking of the initial zoning plan and 
adaptive management to date (McCook et al. 2010; Day and Dobbs 2013). Fish 
catch monitoring is less widespread or effective. Commercial fishing vessels 
are obliged to complete daily fishing logbooks on effort and retained catch with 
the data collated in the Commercial Fisheries Information System. However, 
independent verification of fish catch through on-board fisheries observers is 
limited (Grech and Coles 2011). Going forward, there is growing interest by 
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Table 3: List of theoretically important variables and values across two time-periods. Where 
changes in variables/principles are only associated with the re-zoned time-period they are 
included in the right-hand column of the table. Where variables did not change with the re-
zoning they cut across both time-periods.
Theoretical Variable Pre Re-zoning
(1975–1999)
Post Re-zoning
(2004-to date)
Design principles
Physical boundaries: clarity Clear for the coral reef; Unclear for target fish 
Administrative boundaries: 
clarity and visibility 
For users and managers the administrative zoning boundaries of the 
coral reef are very clear, and for target fish are moderately clear.
Administrative boundaries: 
extent of no-take zones
4% of 345,000 km: 13,800 km2 33% of 345,000: 113,850 km2
Administrative boundaries: 
compliance
Evidence suggests moderate compliance of user groups 
Administrative boundaries: 
negotiability
The zoned boundaries of the GBRMP are rigid (non-negotiable)
Social boundaries: clarity and 
negotiability
The boundary rules are clear, but for commercial fishers they are 
rigid, whereas for recreational fishers they are negotiable. 
The membership allocations for 
commercial fishers were reduced 
through buy-out of fishing licenses.
Ecological and institutional fit The GBRMP Act was designed to ‘fit’ with the biophysical 
boundaries of the system, and the resources being managed.
The re-zoning process explicitly 
accounted for 70 representative 
bioregions.
Collective-choice arrangements Consultative arrangements exist between government and resource-
users. User group representatives participate in some policy and 
planning activities, and lobby for more rights. However, decision-
making power remains with reef and fisheries managers.
Monitoring: Environmental Monitoring is challenged by the spatial extent and remoteness of the 
GBRMP but extensive ecological monitoring is undertaken.
The sophistication of research and 
monitoring is improving over time, 
facilitating adaptive governance.
Monitoring: Compliance Sea and air surveillance monitoring is conducted. Extensive 
education and awareness also aims to promote voluntary compliance. 
Resultant compliance is considered to be moderate, as suggested by 
differences in ecological outcomes in no-entry and no-take zones. 
Monitoring: Social Monitoring of social outcomes has been poor.
A socio-economic monitoring 
protocol is currently under 
development. 
Sanctioning: Graduated sanctions Financial penalties for user non-compliance are different for sectors 
(commercial or recreational), individuals and corporations, and the 
nature of the violation. Local magistrates courts mediate sanctions.
Conflict resolution Analysis of the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms is 
not yet available for the GBRMP. 
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Theoretical Variable Pre Re-zoning
(1975–1999)
Post Re-zoning
(2004-to date)
Extensive consultation of user 
groups during the re-zoning 
process and a seven-year freeze 
on boundary negotiations post re-
zoning aimed to minimize conflict.
Nested governance arrangements The GBRMP Act is administered by a single authority in what can 
be characterized as a highly streamlined polycentric system. Efforts 
to manage external impacts on the Reef through more extensive 
nested enterprises are yet to demonstrate substantial improvements.
SES variables 
Resource characteristics: general Fish are relatively resilient to resource use due to: moderate 
mobility, productivity and renewability. They are also difficult to 
monitor and manage as a result.
Corals are more vulnerable to degradation despite being highly 
productive because they are sessile and take decades rather than 
years to renew populations.
Both fish and corals degrade more rapidly than they recover. 
Resource characteristics: 
connectivity
Improved internal connectivity 
of the reef facilitates recruitment 
of fish and coral larvae and 
spillover of adult fish from no-
take zones into adjacent areas.
External connectivity between GBRMP and adjacent catchments is 
high making the reef highly vulnerable to land-use change. These 
external drivers are intensifying over time.
Actor characteristics: group size Group size of managers is small, of commercial fishing sectors is 
small, and of recreational fishers is high
Numbers of individual 
commercial and recreational 
fishers have declined.
Actor characteristics: 
heterogeneity
Resource user groups are considered to have low economic, social 
and political heterogeneity.
Actor characteristics: Economic 
and cultural dependence
Commercial fishers are economically and culturally highly 
dependent on the resource. Recreational fishers consider themselves 
to be culturally highly dependent on the resource.
Table 3. (Continued)
government and partner research institutions on issues of water quality (Brodie 
and Waterhouse 2012) and climate change (De’ath et al. 2009).
Conformance of users to the zone boundaries and fisheries management rules 
is monitored relatively effectively through sea and air surveillance operations 
by the Reef and Fisheries management actors, alongside other state agencies 
(www.gbrmpa.com.au). Trawlers are also obliged to have vessel monitoring 
systems installed (Day and Dobbs 2013). These track their location by satellite, 
but do not provide information on speed, direction or activity (Grech and Coles 
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2011). Nevertheless, they aid both effort monitoring and compliance monitoring, 
which is important considering the costs of both in the context of the large-scale, 
multi-zoned SES. In some cases the zoning scheme itself further complicates 
surveillance. For example, in the National Park (no-take) Zone boating and diving 
(access) is allowed but extraction is not, and in the Buffer Zone trolling for pelagic 
fish is allowed but line fishing for other fish is prohibited. It is therefore difficult 
to determine in aircraft surveillance whether or not vessels are undertaking illegal 
activities in some cases (Day 2002). Finally, the GBRMP Authority and partners 
actively promote education and voluntary compliance. Overall, compliance is 
considered to be moderate in the GBRMP. In an anonymous survey of recreational 
fishers, 90% reportedly comply with no-take zones (Arias and Sutton 2013). 
However, there is evidence that no-entry zones have a higher fish biomass than no-
take zones, which have a higher biomass than fished zones (McCook et al. 2010), 
suggesting that compliance by commercial and recreational fishers is not complete.
Social monitoring to track the costs and benefits to diverse stakeholder 
groups of management changes has been less systematic across the GBRMP than 
ecological monitoring, but is increasingly acknowledged as important. In 2012 
a project to design a socio-economic monitoring protocol for the GBRMP was 
initiated to redress this disparity (Marshall et al. 2013).
Sanctioning: In the GBRMP non-conformance of users to zoning plans results in 
different types of financial penalties. Fines differ for commercial and recreational 
fishers (e.g. fines can range from ~AU$2000 for illegal recreational fishing to 
>AU$10,000 for illegal commercial fishing www.gbrmpa.com.au), for individuals 
compared to corporations, and according to the nature of the violation. For 
instance, in the GBRMP access to no-take zones is not prohibited, only extraction. 
As a result, commercial fishing vessels found in no-take zones with dories (small 
fishing boats) detached are fined considerably less than vessels caught actively 
harvesting resources. GBRMP inspectors have discretionary power over individual 
violations (Day and Dobbs 2013). But the GBRMP Act 1975 also legislates for a 
very high maximum penalty of AU$5.5 million for aggravated violation by a body 
corporate, should the courts decide to use this sentence (Ibid. 2013). Sanctions 
are adjudicated by local Magistrate Courts. For recreational fishers, a recent study 
found that fishers’ perceptions about sanctions motivated fishers to comply with 
no-take zones (Arias and Sutton 2013).
Conflict resolution mechanisms: In the GBRMP there are several conflict avoidance 
mechanisms in place. There is an emphasis on voluntary compliance through 
education and information facilitated by free zoning maps, online information on 
management plans and regulation, and regional offices in Cairns, Mackay and 
Rockhampton (set up after the re-zoning). With respect to daily use of the marine 
park, Day and Dobbs (2013) suggest that conflict resolution mechanisms are built into 
the GBRMP Authority’s decision-making procedures, including a means to review 
permit decisions. They also refer to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the 
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Ombudsman as two further avenues for adjudication. There is little research or other 
information on levels of conflict around day-to-day management of the GBRMP and 
the use or effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms, such as those detailed 
above. During the re-zoning process, the GBRMP Authority and its partners invested 
in extensive community consultation, reviewing over 30,000 submissions in response 
to the proposed zoning plans. Despite this, high levels of conflict characterised 
the process, particularly among recreational fishers, and there were concerns that 
this could affect future buy-in and compliance to the new GBRMP zoning plans 
(Sutton and Tobin 2009; McCook et al. 2010). At the time the GBRMP Authority 
addressed conflict through increased numbers of smaller consultation meetings and 
though factsheets that corrected key misconceptions (Olsson et al. 2008). In 2007, 
an amendment to the GBRMP Act of 1975 legislated for a freeze on negotiations 
on changing zoning plans for a minimum of seven years from date of establishment 
under the premise of providing stability to businesses, communities and biological 
systems. This has to some extent allowed tensions over the re-zoning process to 
dissipate. Finally, the GBR Region Outlook Report summarizing the status of the 
Reef every five years helps to increase transparency of management outcomes.
Nested governance arrangements: Nested governance primarily refers to the vertical 
linkages across jurisdictions connecting local to national scales of management, for 
instance. Polycentric governance captures vertical, cross-scale linkages as well as 
horizontal linkages among different management actors (Ostrom 2005; Biggs et al. 
2012). In the GBRMP federal and state governments jointly manage the GBRMP; 
several pieces of legislation formalise co-management arrangements between 
GBRMP Authority and Indigenous Owner groups; and the GBRMP Authority 
consult Local Marine Advisory Committees in twelve locations along the GBR 
Region’s coastline. Other federal, state and local agencies are also involved in 
specific elements of GBRMP management, such as surveillance or protection of 
its World Heritage Values. There is even overlap in implementation of key pieces 
of legislation, including the GBRMP Act 1975, EPBC Act 1999, and Marine 
Parks Act 2004. These constitute a polycentric governance system. However, 
considering the size of the SES (345,000 km2) and the diversity of uses managed – 
fishing, tourism, traditional use, research, shipping, defence training – we suggest 
that the GBRMP is relatively centralised or at least represents a highly streamlined 
polycentric governance system. By this we mean that authority is shared among 
relatively few different actors. In many places, a SES of this size would cross 
multiple state or provincial boundaries and would involve many sector-based state 
agencies (conservation, fisheries, tourism, ports and shipping) without the benefit 
of a unifying agency and over-arching legislation. The success of the GBRMP can 
be attributed to its clear governance arrangements. As Day and Dobbs (2013, 2) 
articulate, “today the GBRMP is a large, single, multiple-use MPA”.
However, impacts originating from beyond the boundaries of the GBR Region 
and the current jurisdiction of the GBRMP Authority pose a challenge to the current 
governance system. The GBRMP Act (1975) and the EPBC Act (1999) both include 
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clauses related to regulating or prohibiting activities that reduce water quality 
and impact the Reef. The GBRMP Authority has triggered and been involved 
in developing a strategy to address water quality in the Region, which includes 
the Reef Water Quality Protection Plan (2003 updated 2009 and 2013), the Reef 
Water Quality Partnership (2007) involving three Federal agencies (Department 
of Agriculture, Department of the Environment, and GBRMP Authority), several 
state agencies, and the regional Natural Resource Management Bodies, and a Reef 
Rescue package worth AU$ 200 million (2008–2013) and a further AU$ 200–375 
(2013 onwards). These actions demonstrate broader nested governance and the 
potential for improvements in water quality from catchment land use (Brodie and 
Waterhouse 2012), although coral cover continues to decline (De’ath et al. 2012). 
More controversially, the GBRMP Authority and Queensland’s state government 
are also involved in assessments and planning with other agencies over coastal 
development, in particular port development, largely in response to a pending 
UNESCO ruling that may change the status of the GBR Region World Heritage 
Area to one listed as ‘in danger’ (UNESCO 2012). Action on climate change is 
non-regulatory and is limited to education and voluntary stewardship activities. 
Brodie and Waterhouse (2012, 2) review multiple stressors, their impacts, and 
the associated management effectiveness and suggest that overall there is “a lack 
of integration of research, management and monitoring activities” related to the 
land-sea interface.
4.3.2. Other important variables
Resource characteristics: The characteristics of CPR systems and their resource 
units, such as their mobility, productivity and renewability (Ostrom 2007) affect 
their ‘governability’ (Jentoft 2007). In the GBRMP the particular characteristics 
of the two resources coded – target fish and corals – mean they vary in their 
vulnerability to, and recovery from, resource use. The target fish of the GBR 
Region have a number of attributes, in aggregate,1
 that make them relatively 
resilient to resource use but also difficult to monitor and manage. If you consider 
both horizontal and vertical space, fish are moderately mobile. For example, 
barramundi migrate from freshwater rivers to the ocean while some pelagic fish 
travel throughout the Indo-Pacific. Even reef-associated target fish are relatively 
mobile compared to other resources, such as corals and trees. Target fish also 
have moderate productivity and renewability. Russ and colleagues (2008) report 
a significant increase in density of coral trout in no-take zones of the GBRMP 
within two years of re-zoning but have highlighted elsewhere that full recovery 
of some long-lived predator species could be between 15–40 years (Russ and 
Alcala 2004). Corals, on the other hand, while very productive, are arguably 
more vulnerable to degradation than target fish because they are sessile and take 
decades rather than years to renew populations (low renewability). Despite some 
1
 These differ by species.
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inherent resilience to resource use, both fish and corals can potentially be rapidly 
over-exploited or degraded, as the speed of feedback from use of these resources 
is higher than the speed of feedback from management, meaning damage is 
achieved quicker than recovery.
These characteristics of the resource system did not change as a result of 
management, but do have important implications for management success. 
Arguably, spatial, precautionary management, which was enhanced through the 
re-zoning process, is highly suited to resources with higher potential to decline 
than to recover, although it is challenged by the mobile and cryptic nature of these 
under-water resources (Toonen et al. 2013).
One resource characteristic important in the GBRMP case but not well 
considered in the small-scale CPR literature is biophysical connectivity. 
Connectivity can catalyse degradation or facilitate recovery of reef ecosystems. 
Target fish and coral reefs are considered to have moderate internal connectivity, 
referring to linkages within the system such as among fish populations or between 
reef habitats. Empirical evidence supports the role of no-take areas as sources 
of recruitment (coral and fish larvae) and spill-over (adult fish) to other areas, 
although the extent of this varies by species and according to other environmental 
factors (currents, physical barriers, temperature) (Nyström and Folke 2001; 
McCook et al. 2010; Harrison et al. 2012; Wen et al. 2013). On the whole, internal 
connectivity through recruitment and spill-over occurs at a sub-regional scale, 
not throughout the whole GBRMP, so populations of corals and fish are relatively 
distinct between the northern and southern reefs and between inshore and offshore 
reefs. This moderate internal connectivity helps maintain resilience of reefs to 
disturbance while allowing users to benefit from conservation efforts. However, 
the difficulty in observing these dynamics and scientifically demonstrating them 
is one source of tension between users and managers in this system. Further, 
GBR Region resources have strong external connectivity between the adjacent 
catchments and the reef ecosystems, resulting in significant impacts on reef 
ecosystems from land-based sources (Brodie and Waterhouse 2012).
Actor characteristics: The attributes of resource users, such as size, heterogeneity 
of users and their dependence on a resource are central to CPR theory (Ostrom 
2007), though evidence of how these attributes affect government outcomes 
remains mixed (Poteete and Ostrom 2004). The two primary user groups considered 
in this analysis are commercial and recreational fishers. Commercial fishing is the 
largest extractive activity in the GBRMP worth between AU$123–140 million per 
year depending on the year (GBRMPA 2009; Deloitte Access Economics 2013). 
Lédée et al. (2012) report that fishing was the sole source of household income 
for most fishers in the GBRMP with 88–92% of household income derived from 
commercial fishing for trawl and line fishers, respectively. A comprehensive long-
term monitoring programme on the socio-economics of the Reef also finds that 
commercial fishing contributed around 80% of the household income for most 
households interviewed, though the average across all fishers was 65% (Marshall 
418 Louisa S. Evans et al.
et al. 2013). Many commercial fishers also demonstrate strong occupational 
and place attachment (Marshall and Marshall 2007). These studies suggest that 
commercial fishers have high economic and cultural dependence on the GBRMP. 
A socio-economic assessment just prior to the re-zoning process identified 1691 
full time equivalent people employed in commercial fishing (representing 0.5% 
of employment in the GBR Region catchment). The assessment suggested that 
only 10.5% of the Gross Value of Production would be lost through re-zoning 
and concluded that the impacts on the commercial fishing sector would be modest 
(Hand 2003 in Macintosh et al. 2010). Yet, there was concern from government and 
industry over the impacts of the re-zoning on fishing dependent communities and 
substantial tension over fishers’ perceptions that they were unfairly disadvantaged 
by the process. The result was a Structural Adjustment Package that purportedly 
far exceeded the economic costs of the re-zoning (Macintosh et al. 2010).
Almost 200,000 people fish recreationally in the GBRMP (700,000 across the 
state of Queensland) (Hand 2003 in GBRMPA 2009; Macintosh et al. 2010; Taylor 
et al. 2012). While participation has declined since 2000, recreational fishing 
is still cited as among the top leisure activities for Queenslanders suggesting 
high cultural dependence (Taylor et al. 2012). Indeed, recreational fishers in 
Queensland coined the slogan “I FISH and I VOTE” to strengthen their voice 
in political lobbying for their rights. Yet, the majority of fishers are not members 
of representative organisations, making it more difficult to co-ordinate this large 
number of resource users.
4.4. Challenges
Entering the GBRMP case into the SES database forced us to make judgments 
about the most important components of the system, a process that has benefits 
and drawbacks. A benefit is that it requires an assessment by coders about key 
components of the SES, in particular for determining key actors and resource 
components. Narrowing down these components made coding tractable while 
still allowing for a qualitative analysis of the GBRMP SES and facilitating 
future comparisons with other cases. However, because the database explicitly 
accounts for linkages between distinct system components, the amount of coding 
can increase exponentially with each additional component, which also meant 
excluding many of the complexities that are inherent in large-scale SES. For 
example, many additional actor groups are important in the GBRMP, such as 
tourism operators and aboriginal co-managers, but we limited coding to those for 
which there is sufficient data and evidence of extractive influence in the system 
at the scale of the whole reef (i.e. commercial and recreational fishers). Similarly, 
the resource system could be divided into many additional components, such as 
functional groups. We limited our assessment to two components – targeted fish 
and coral cover – that capture broad ecological successes and failures of the park. 
Analytically, this presents a challenge because the coders decide a priori which 
components are important, and hence any subsequent analyses can only be done 
on variables associated with those components already deemed important. Thus 
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the coding process forces simplification of complex systems, but makes analyses 
of coded components of large-scale SES tractable.
One important implication of the approach taken in this paper is that we 
focused on the GBRMP and changes in governance related to zoning and fisheries 
management. We have thus accounted for significant land-based, extreme event, 
and climate change impacts by coding them as external factors. Considering the 
increasing impetus on managing externalities from coastal development and 
catchment land-use in the region, a future approach could be to conceptualise the 
region as a single, larger coastal SES and to include, for example, graziers, the 
mining industry, and developers as additional actor components that are internal 
to the system. This would enable analysis of variables capturing key attributes of 
these actors. Such an approach would be complicated, in particular, in assigning 
attribution to particular interactions.
Another key drawback of such analysis of large-scale systems is the complexity 
and detail lost in aggregating components and averaging trends and outcomes. This 
is necessary for meta-analysis but limits analytical depth. For example, we averaged 
attributes for target fish across all target species, many of which differ in their biology 
and ecology. Similarly, individual operators within each of these commercial fishery 
sectors can differ significantly in terms of dependence, market share, social capital 
and involvement in management. Yet, when we consider the user groups as made 
up of sectors as opposed to individuals, the ‘members’ are relatively homogenous. 
Social and ecological outcomes for different fish species and individual commercial 
actors would also differ, but are captured as aggregate trends. This limits the extent 
to which our analysis can draw inferences about some of the key CPR variables. 
For example, actor size and heterogeneity do not have consistent units applied 
across cases but are to some extent an artefact of the categorisations made to code 
variables, as appropriate to each case (i.e. individuals, sectors, or agencies). This 
differs from the small-scale literature, where single units (individuals) can be used 
to describe communities or groups interacting with an ecosystem.
Similarly, the need to compare across cases coded in SESMAD necessitates 
aggregation of certain ‘relative’ variables, which loses a level of disaggregated 
detail that would favour within-case diagnosis. For example, in the GBRMP 
ecological and institutional fit improved with the Representative Areas Program 
so is relatively better after re-zoning than before. However, since its establishment 
the GBRMP demonstrates good ecological and institutional fit compared to other 
large-scale SES. So, in this case, both time-periods (1975–1999 and 2004–2012) 
are coded as showing no governance-resource mis-match, hence, forfeiting subtle 
differences between pre- and post- re-zoning.
5. Discussion
The GBRMP case provides some insights into the relevance of design principles 
at a large scale, although complexity, scale, and data limitations make attribution 
420 Louisa S. Evans et al.
of outcomes to specific variables challenging. Regardless of these challenges, we 
were able to assess the impact of eight principles on both social and ecological 
outcomes within the GBR Region, and to evaluate their applicability to large SES.
In regards to fisheries, many species have experienced improved trends as a result 
of management activities, most notably the re-zoning of the GBRMP administrative 
boundaries to extend the area of no-take zones, and their clear communication to 
potential users. The influence of the re-zoning on coral cover is not as clear-cut as 
expected. There is some evidence for improved resilience of corals to disturbance 
events within no-take zones, but overall coral cover continues to decline throughout 
the GRBMP, particularly in inshore reefs (Sweatman 2008; Hughes et al. 2011; 
De’ath et al. 2012). Some of the mixed results in coral cover (which also extends 
to other coastal habitats) can be explained by natural and anthropogenic drivers 
that originate outside of the GBRMP system. Reduced intervals between multiple 
disturbance events, including population explosions of crown-of-thorns starfish, 
temperature anomalies causing coral bleaching and mortality, tropical cyclones, and 
fresh-water pulses from flooding events, compound chronic stress from nutrient-
loaded run-off and siltation. While direct impacts on target fish are not yet clearly 
evident, long-term degradation of coral, mangrove and seagrass habitats is expected 
to eventually impact coral-dependent and coral-associated fish species (Hughes 
et al. 2003; Munday et al. 2008). These findings suggest that external drivers 
are still important impacts on large-scale systems: while the boundaries of the 
GBRMP are considered to be clear and there is ecological and institutional fit in 
the marine social-ecological system, the administrative boundaries are not presently 
designed to account for external factors. If we consider the broader coastal SES, 
including the catchments, the GBRMP Act and its implementing actors demonstrate 
less institutional and ecological fit and a stronger need for more effective nested 
governance arrangements than are evident to date.
On the other hand, this highly streamlined polycentric governance system has 
been considered very successful in integrating different state and federal agencies 
and managing multiple uses within the GBR Region. While a range of agencies, 
policies and laws are involved in management of the GBRMP, the GBRMP Act 
1975 has precedence over all these other laws in the event of any inconsistencies 
(Day and Dobbs 2013). This contrasts with the degree of polycentricism in coastal 
governance in the USA, for example, which involves 20 Federal agencies and the 
conflicting interests that stalled implementation of the Channel Islands National 
Marine Sanctuary in California (Crowder et al. 2006). Contrasting the GBRMP 
Authority with the USA experience suggests that burgeoning polycentricity 
may not be an advantage. In certain circumstances the diversity and redundancy 
provided by polycentricity may be countered by the efficiency and control of more 
centralised systems. On the other hand, polycentricity is thought to confer some 
level of resilience to SES (Biggs et al. 2012). It is, therefore, possible that low 
polycentricity may leave governance systems, like the GBRMP Act, vulnerable to 
political interference and de-gazettement, as is being threatened in other parts of 
Australia, because fewer actors are bound to the institutions.
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Contrary to CPR theory, the success of the GBRMP in regards to fish stocks 
biomass and resilience of corals to disturbance is not underpinned by high influence 
of users in monitoring activities or collective choice arrangements. Members of the 
community of resource users undertake little of the ecological, compliance, and 
social monitoring (although there are some examples of participation in ecological 
monitoring by users), and monitors are not directly accountable to resource users. 
Furthermore, the rezoning consultation process was not perceived to be legitimate 
by many recreational (Sutton and Tobin 2009) and commercial fishers (Lédée 
et al. 2012). Teh-White et al. (2004) suggest that recreational fishers felt that they 
were not treated fairly compared to other stakeholders, and their feedback was 
not clearly incorporated into the re-zoned plans. A majority of commercial fishers 
also felt that they were not fairly treated or adequately consulted and compensated 
(Lédée et al. 2012). Macintosh et al. (2010) suggest that some of this discontent 
was due to the rushed development of the Structural Adjustment Package which 
was handled separately from the Representative Areas Programme process, but 
which was seen as part of the Representative Areas Programme by resource 
users. Nevertheless, in the GBR Region case, scientific integrity, a relative lack 
of corruption in policing and law enforcement, and a well-established and stable 
government may substitute for these principles.
Our analysis provides clear examples of how complexity and scale affect the 
classical interpretation of design principles. In large scale systems, the size of the 
resource system and interactions between resource units, and the increased number 
of actor groups and types of use rights seem to be principal drivers that constrain 
the applicability of design principles, albeit not all of them in equal manner. For 
example, both collective choice arrangements and minimum recognition of rights 
to organize are limited given that participation by all or most of resource users 
in large scale SES is impractical. Similarly, participation of resource users in 
monitoring activities is reduced due to coordination challenges and bureaucratic/
governance arrangements. Furthermore, availability of low-cost conflict resolution 
mechanisms is challenged by the increasing diversity of conflicts emerging from 
the expansion of use rights types. The key question going forward is whether 
other mechanisms, such as higher-level representation or broad trust in science 
and law, fully compensate for these design principles at larger scales or at least 
mitigate against governance failures. Even though the current design principles 
cannot be viewed as a set of necessary conditions for devising robust institutions 
in the case of large-scale environmental problems such as the conservation of the 
Great Barrier Reef (Young 2002), they can arguably still be used to inform the 
process of creating effective and legitimate governance arrangements.
6. Conclusion
This analysis of the GBRMP as a large-scale SES benefitted from a systematic 
coding effort utilizing the SES framework and the SESMAD coding protocols. 
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This study highlights the mixed outcomes of the GBRMP, which is typically lauded 
as a governance success. Success is broadly attributed to significant and clearly 
defined changes in administrative boundaries of the GBRMP altering usufruct 
rights, and to changes in fisheries management institutions and social boundaries 
in commercial fisheries. These boundary and rights changes were supported by 
effective monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution. We argue further that 
success is underpinned by other CPR variables, which remained consistent through 
time but which characterised effective management of the GBRMP. For instance, 
moderate biophysical connectivity was important for improved outcomes. We 
attribute continued governance challenges to connectivity and boundary issues 
between the land-sea interface, external drivers impacting the marine SES, and 
the current lack of effective polycentric institutions to govern the region at the 
scale of the larger coastal SES.
In terms of CPR theory, our analysis of the GBRMP as a large-scale SES 
argued that the governance system is a highly streamlined polycentric system with 
relatively little opportunity for resource users to directly influence rule making. 
These facets appear to contradict CPR theory, though we suggest that instead 
these findings point to the need to better conceptualise the design principles of 
collective-choice arrangements and nested enterprises (polycentricity) for large-
scale systems analysis.
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